REMARKS

Claims 1-14 remain in the application. Further examination and reconsideration of the application is hereby requested.

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In Section 2 of the Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 1-6 and 8-9 under 35 USC 102(e) as being anticipated by Meyerzon et al. Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection as Meyerzon does not disclose "recognizing a *temporal field within the address*" as Applicants are claiming. "Invalidity for

10 anticipation requires that all of the elements and limitations of the claim are found within a single prior art reference. ... There must be no difference between the claimed invention and the reference disclosure, as viewed by a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention." Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech Inc., 18 USPQ.2d 1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

15 Specifically, for claim 1, the Applicants are claiming "obtaining an address for said document" and then "recognizing a temporal field within said address." Meyerzon instead discloses that "[d]uring a Web crawl, document address specifications are used to retrieve copies of the corresponding electronic documents. Information from each electronic document retrieved during a Web

20 crawl is stored in an index and associated with the corresponding document address specification and with a crawl number modified." (col. 2, lines 46-51). And, "In accordance with further aspects of this invention, during an incremental crawl, prior to retrieving an electronic document copy, the time stamp of the current electronic document is compared with the previously stored time stamp of

25 a previously retrieved electronic document corresponding to the current electronic document. If the respective time stamps match, the current electronic document is considered to be substantively equivalent to its corresponding previously retrieved electronic document copy, and is therefore not retrieved during the current incremental crawl. Preferably, the comparison of time stamps is performed by

30 sending a request to a server to transfer the current electronic document if the time stamp associated with the current electronic document is more recent than a time stamp included in the request." (col. 3, lines 28-43 and see also col. 5, lines 35-47)).

Meyerzon does not "recognize a temporal field *within* the address" but

35 instead creates a timestamp when a document is read and this timestamp is included with the URL (address), hash value and crawl number in a persistent history map (aka database) that is stored in memory on the computer. (see col. 5, lines 13-17 and col.10, lines 17-19). This timestamp in Meyerzon is defined as

the time that the corresponding electronic document was retrieved by the Web crawler (see col. 10, lines 25-28). This timestamp is not part of the address nor located within the address as Applicants are claiming. Rather, the timestamp of Meyerzon is an additional piece of data stored with the address in the crawl

5 history map on the computer. Meyerzon does not further "modify said temporal field of said address to reflect a different instance" but rather compares the time stamp of the document on the web site with the timestamp recorded in the history map and only if the time stamps differ does Meyerzon retrieve the document. (See col. 5, lines 42-47). Never does Meyerzon describe "modifying the temporal

10 field" within the address and "retrieving an updated document using the *modified address*." Meyerzon does not modify the address but rather just retrieves the document with the same address (and not a modified address) based on a change in timestamps of when the document was created.

This difference is an important distinction recognizable by one of ordinary

15 skill in the art. Many web sites may create similar documents that are updated (such as news sources) but retain the old documents for retrieval as well. Meyerzon only discloses retrieving a document when that document at a fixed URL address has been updated. Applicants claimed invention allows for retrieval of a document that is updated but which has a different address that is

20 distinguishable from the earlier document by the inclusion of a temporal field within the address. (See Applicants' spec. page 2, lines 15-27). Accordingly, Meyerzon does not disclose, teach, or suggest Applicants claim 1.

Claims 2-4 are deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which they depend.

25 Claim 5 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends but is also believed separately patentable over Meyerzon. Claim 5 claims further "the step of sequentially searching said address for a temporal pattern from a database of possible temporal patterns." Meyerzon only discloses a database of timestamps and not a database of "temporal patterns"

30 which are described in the specification as different date and time strings in which the temporal fields may be formatted within an address (see page 7, lines 5-14). This ability to scan a database of different temporal fields is important because there is no standard practice on how to include such fields in the address of the document. (see page 2, lines 16-17). Accordingly, Meyerzon does not disclose,

35 teach, or suggest this limitation.

Claim 6 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends but is also believed separately patentable over Meyerzon. Claim 6 includes the further steps of "obtaining a second address for said

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document, said second address having a different instance of said temporal field" and "comparing the first address to said second address to recognize *a pattern* of said temporal field." As noted previously, Meyerzon does not look at a temporal field but rather retrieves the date that the document was created from the website.

5   Meyerson is not looking to recognize a pattern in the temporal field as Applicants are claiming but rather if the different dates have changed. Since Meyerzon does not disclose an address that is changing, it accordingly cannot be looking to compare that the address has changed and accordingly recognize a pattern of the temporal field within the address. Accordingly, Meyerzon does not disclose,

10   teach, or suggest the limitations in claim 6.

Claim 8 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends but is also believed separately patentable over Meyerzon. Claim 8 includes the limitations of "calculating ... an adjustment interval" "formatting ... to fit a pattern of said temporal field" and "substituting the formatted

15   different instance into said temporal field." Since Meyerzon does not disclose modifying the address but rather retrieves the electronic document form the same address depending a different timestamp retrieved from the web site, Meyerzon is not "substituting the formatted different instance into said temporal field". Accordingly, Meyerzon does not disclose, teach, or suggest the limitations in claim

20   8.

Claim 9 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends.

Withdrawal of the rejection under 35 USC 102(e) for claims 1-6 and 8-9 and their allowance is respectfully requested.

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In Section 3 of the Office Action, the Examiner rejected claims 10-14 under 35 USC 102(e) as being anticipated by Chow et al. Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection as Chow only discloses retrieving an updated document as with an address having a temporal field as described above. Chow does not

30   disclose "periodically updating a temporal field in the address of said document" as Applicants are claiming. The Examiner states that Chow discloses such at col. 10, lines 45-61 and col. 12, lines 45-67 but this is not correct. Chow discloses that the "time field" is the Last_Modified time from the remote server when the document was previously obtained; it is not a temporal field within the address.

35   Like Meyerzon, Chow discloses retrieving a document that has changed contents at a fixed address location. Applicants in claim 10 are claiming "periodically updating a temporal field in the address" and thus allow for retrieving an updated version of a document that is stored under a different address on the remote

server. Accordingly, Chow does not disclose, teach or suggest Applicants' claimed invention.

Claims 11, 13, and 14 are deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 10 from which they depend.

Claim 12 is deemed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 10 but is believed to be separately patentable. Claim 12 further includes the limitation of a "database of patterns of possible temporal fields." This limitation is not disclosed, taught, or suggested by Chow. The Chow location (col 12, lines 45-67) that the Examiner refers to does not disclose a "database of temporal fields" but rather discloses converting URLs to full path names and locking files by appending a ".lock" suffix to the "cache file name" (not the address of the document).to prevent simultaneous access. Further, claim 12 includes the limitation of the processor scanning "said address with the sequentially accessed patterns" from the database to look for the temporal field and "wherein upon identifying said temporal field said processor updates said temporal field." These limitations are not disclosed, taught or suggested by Chow as Chow does not update a temporal field in the address as Applicants claim in claim 10.

Withdrawal of the rejection under 35 USC 102(e) for claims 10-14 and their allowance is respectfully requested.

In Section 4 of the Office Action, the Examiner rejected claim 7 under 35 USC 103(a) as being unpatentable over Meyerzon in view of Chow. Claim 7 is believed patentable based at least on the patentability of claim 1 from which it depends for the reasons presented previously for Meyerzon. Withdrawal of the rejection under 35 USC 103(a) is respectfully requested.

Applicants believe their claims are patentable over the art made of record. Accordingly, claims 1-14 are deemed to be in condition for allowance, and such allowance is respectfully requested.

If for any reason the Examiner finds the Application other than in a condition for allowance, the Examiner is respectfully requested to call Applicants' undersigned representative at the number listed below to discuss the steps necessary for placing the application in condition for allowance.

The Commissioner is hereby authorized to charge any additional fees that may be required, or credit any overpayment to Deposit Account No. 08-2025. Should such fees be associated with an extension of time, Applicants respectfully request that this paper be considered a petition therefore.

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